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ESSAY

IGNORANCE OF LAW IS AN EXCUSE
BUT ONLY FOR THE VIRTUOUS

-

Dan M. Kahan*
If you want to

know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the
vaguer sanctions of conscience.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1

It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal
could not have known that he was breaking the law, but to admit
[mistake of law as an] excuse at all would be to encourage ignorance
where the law-maker has determined to make men know and obey,
and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger inter
ests on the other side of the scales.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.2
It's axiomatic that "ignorance of the law is no excuse." My aim
in this essay is to examine what the "mistake of law doctrine"3
reveals about the relationship between criminal law and morality in
general and about the law's understanding of moral responsibility
in particular.
The conventional understanding of the mistake of law doctrine
rests on two premises, which are encapsulated in the Holmesian ep
igrams with which I've started this essay. The first is liberal positiv
ism. As a descriptive claim, liberal positivism holds that the content
of the law can be identified without reference to morality: one
needn't be a good man to perceive what's lawful, Holm.es tells us;
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. B,A. 1986, Middlebury; J.D.
1989, Harvard. - Ed. I am grateful to the Russell J. Parsons & Jerome S. Weiss Funds for
Faculty Research at the University of Chicago Law School for generous financial support; to
Albert Alschuler, Kate Anderson, Darryl Brown, Elizabeth Garrett, Jack Goldsmith, Tracey
Meares, Martha Nussbaum, John Parry, and Eric Posner for instructive comments on an ear
lier draft; and to Jason Fliegel for first-rate research assistance.
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897).
2. OUVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE CoMMON LAW 41 (Belknap Press 1963) (1881).
3. I will use this phrase as a generic shorthand for the proposition that neither ignorance
of the existence of penal law nor a mistake as to the meaning of that law is (ordinarily) an
excuse. See generally JosHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CR!MINAL LAw 147 (2d ed. 1995)
(setting forth rule and exceptions).

127

128

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:127

one need only understand the consequences in store if one should
choose to act badly.4 The nonnative side of liberal positivism urges
us to see the independence of law from morality as a good thing. In
a pluralistic society, the law should aspire to be comprehensible to
persons of diverse moral views. What's more, it should avoid em
bodying within itself a standard of culpability or blame that de
pends on an individual's acceptance of any such view as orthodox;
in a liberal society, even the bad man can be a good citizen so long
as he lives up to society's rules.s
Liberal positivism supports denying a mistake of law defense
when combined with a second premise: the utility of legal knowl
edge. 6 Under the liberal positivist view, the law disclaims any reli
ance on the moral knowledge of citizens, as well as any ambition to
make them value morality for its own sake. Accordingly, to pro
mote good (that is, law-abiding) conduct, it becomes imperative
that citizens be made aware of the content of the law and the conse
quences of breaking it. Hence, the law shows no mercy for those
who claim to be ignorant of what the criminal law proscribes, a po
sition that maximizes citizens' incentive to learn the rules that "the
law-maker has determined to make men know and obey."7
I want to challenge the accuracy of this account of why igno
rance of law does not excuse. In its place, I'll suggest an alternative
understanding, which rests on premises diametrically opposed to
the Holmesian aphorisms that undergird the classic account.
The first premise of this anti-Holmesian conception is legal mor
alism. 8 This principle asserts that law is suffused with morality and;
as a result, can't ultimately be identified or applied law without the
making of moral judgments. It asserts, too, that individuals are ap
propriately judged by the law not only for the law-abiding quality of
4. On the independence of law from morals, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
185-212 {2d ed. 1994).
5. On the connection between legal positivism and liberal political theory, see Jeremy
Waldron, Kant's Legal Positivism, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1535 {1996).
6. Jerome Hall, at least, viewed liberal positivism as more or less sufficient to support the
mistake of law doctrine. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 383
(2d ed. 1960) ("[T]here is a basic incompatibility between asserting that the law is what cer
tain officials declare it to be . . . and asserting, also
that the law is, what defendants or
their lawyers believed it to be."). For a compelling rebuttal, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RE
THINKING CruMINAL LAW § 9.3, at 733-34 (1978).
7. HoLMES, supra note 2, at 41; see also GLANVILLE WILUAMs, CRIMINAL LAW: THE
GENERAL PART 289 {2d ed. 1961) Gustifying the doctrine on the same grounds).
8. For a general account of this idea and a discussion of the tension between liberalism
and a conception of punishment that takes account of an offender's character and values, see
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Mora/ism and Liberalism, 37 Aruz. L. REv. 73 {1995).
.
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their actions but also for the moral quality of their values, motiva
tions, and emotions - in a word, for the quality of their characters. 9
The second premise of the anti-Holmesian view can be called
the prudence of obfuscation. Moral judgments are too rich and par
ticular to be subdued by any set of abstract rules; as a result, law
will always embody morality only imperfectly. That means that
from the standpoint of legal moralism, private knowledge of the law

isn't unambiguously good. The more readily individuals can dis
cover the law's content, the more readily they'll be able to discern,
and exploit, the gaps between what's immoral and what's illegal.
The law must therefore employ strategies to discourage citizens
from gaining knowledge for this purpose. One is to deny an excuse
for ignorance of law. Punishing those who mistakenly believe their
conduct to be legal promotes good (that is, moral) behavior less
through encouraging citizens to learn the law - an objective that
could in fact be more completely realized by excusing at least some
mistakes - than by creating hazards for those who choose to rely
on what they think they know about the law. By denying a mistake
of law defense, the law is saying, contra Holmes, that if a citizen
suspects the law fails to prohibit some species of immoral conduct,
the only certain way to avoid criminal punishment is to be a good
person rather than a bad one.
This anti-Holmesian account, I'll argue, not only offers a supe
rior explanation of why ignorance of the law is not ordinarily re
garded as an excuse; it also does a better job in explaining why it
sometimes is. Sometimes it's a crime to engage in an act - for
example, omitting to file a tax return or failing to report certain
financial transactions - that wouldn't be viewed as immoral were it
not for the existence of a legal duty. Crimes of this sort are often
referred to as malum prohibitum
wrong because prohibited and are distinguished from crimes that are malum in se - wrong in
themselves independent of law. Malum prohibitum crimes are the
ones most likely to be interpreted as permitting mistake of law de
fenses.10 This aspect of the doctrine defies both premises of the
classic position: to distinguish malum prohibitum crimes from ma-

9. For the exploration of this theme in connection with various other doctrines of sub
stantive criminal law, see Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1423
(1995), and Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions ofEmotion in Criminal
Law, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 269 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separa
tion in Criminal Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 625, 646 (1984); Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant
to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARv. L. REv. 469, 478-79 (1996); Michael L. Travers, Com
ment, Mistake of Law in Mala Prohibita Crimes, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1301 (1995).
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lum in se ones, courts must employ moral judgments of the sort that
liberal positivism forbids; and by allowing a mistake of law defense
for malum prohibitum crimes, courts relax citizens' incentives to
learn the law. Excusing someone for ignorance of a malum prohib
itum

crime

makes

perfect

sense,

however,

under

the

anti

Holmesian view: since morality abstracted from law has nothing to
say about the underlying conduct, a person can't be expected to rely
on her perception of morality rather than her understanding of
what such laws prohibit; because even a good person could make
that kind of mistake in such circumstances, the defendant is
excused.

A final advantage associated with the anti-Holmesian under
standing of mistake of law is that it more completely defends the
doctrine from the standard criticism made of it. Denying a mistake
of law defense, it is said, sanctions punishment of the morally
blameless.11 The classic conception demurs: "[J]ustice to the indi
vidual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side
of the scales."12 But the anti-Holmesian conception goes further,
showing that the standard criticism rests on a truncated understand
ing of when punishment is just: a person is rightly condemned as a
criminal wrongdoer not only for knowingly choosing to violate the
law, but also for exhibiting the kind of character failing associated
with insufficient commitment to the moral norms embodied in the
community's criminal law.
My argument will unfold in three Parts, each of which tells the
story of a citizen who made, or at least claimed to have made, a
mistake of law. Part I describes the case of Julio Marrero, a federal
prison guard who reasonably but mistakenly concluded that he was
authorized to carry a handgun; the failure of his mistake of law de
fense discredits the claim that the doctrine is geared toward maxi
mizing citizens' incentive to learn the law. Part II takes up the case
of Cleora Olive King; her conviction for possession of a controlled
substance exposes the jaundiced eye with which the law regards
those who do what

they think is legal rather than what they know is

moral. Part ill examines the case of John Cheek, an offender

11. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 9.3, at 731, 735; Douglas Husak & Andrew von
Hirsch, Culpability and Mistake of Law, in AcnoN AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 157, 159,
174 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993); John T. Parry, Reasonable Reliance on Official Interpre
tations of Criminal Law: Entrapment by Estoppel, Mistake of Law, and the Risk Against
Estopping the Government, 25 AM. J. CruM. L. (forthcoming 1997); cf. John Calvin Jeffries,
Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 209

(1985) ("If notice of illegality is an essential prerequisite to the fairness of punishment, how
the law be indifferent to claims of honest and reasonable mistake?").
12. HoLMES, supra note 2, at 41.

can
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whose right to assert a mistake of law defense for criminal tax eva
sion proves that ignorance of the law is an excuse - but only for
the virtuous.
I.

MARRERO: THE IMPUDENCE OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE

Who exactly is the mistake of law doctrine afraid of? The an
swer suggested by the classic view is the strategically heedless. Were
mistake of law a defense, a person bent on violating the rights of
others - Holmes's "bad man" - could evade punishment by re
maining studiously ignorant of his legal duties.
But the specter of strategic heedlessness is a fairly obvious piece
of misdirection. To be sure, strict liability for mistakes of law takes
the profit out of deliberate ignorance, but it's such a wildly overin
clusive solution to that problem that it's impossible to view the stra
tegically heedless as more than a bit player in the mistake of law
drama. The real protagonist is someone else; to see who, consider

People

v.

Marrero.13

Julio Marrero was charged with unlicensed possession of a
handgun. When police arrested him (at 1:00 a.m. at a Manhattan
disco), Marrero protested that he was authorized to carry the
weapon under New York law because he was a guard at a federal
prison in nearby Danbury, Connecticut.14 Marrero's understanding
of the law was mistaken.
But understandably so. New York's gun law expressly ex
empted "peace officers,"15 a term defined, under a section of the
state's criminal procedure code, to include "correction officers of
any state correctional facility or of any penal correctional institu
tion. "16 Marrero concluded that "any penal correctional institu
tion," as distinguished from "any state correctional facility," meant
any federal prison. That was how his instructor in a local criminal
justice course explained it to him, and it was also how the statutes
were understood by local gun dealers, who routinely sold weapons
to federal prison guards without demanding proof that the guards
were licensed to carry such weapons.17
Indeed, Marrero's reading of the law was so plausible that the
courts nearly accepted it as correct. The trial court dismissed the
13. 507 N.E.2d 1068 (N.Y. 1987).
14. See 501 N.E.2d at 1068-69; David De Gregorio, Comment, People v. Marrero and
Mistake of Law, 54 BROOK. L. R:Ev. 229, 231-33 (1988).
15. N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20(a)(l)(a) (McKinney 1987).
16. N.Y. C.P.L. 2.10(26) (McKinney 1987).
17. See De Gregorio, supra note 14, at 240-41 & n.54.
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indictment after ruling that federal corrections officers were indeed
"peace officers" for purposes of the gun law;1s that decision was
overturned on appeal, but by a court that divided 3-2.19 At the end
of the day, three of six judges had sided with Marrero's interpreta
tion. It's hard to imagine a more demonstrably reasonable mistake
of law.
At trial, however, Marrero was not afforded the opportunity to
assert a mistake of law defense to the jury, or even to present evi
dence about the reasonable basis of that mistake. According to the
trial court, and ultimately to the New York Court of Appeals, Mar
rero's ignorance of the law - however reasonable - was no
excuse.20
Even this aspect of the case, however, was subject to reasonable
disagreement. It's usually accepted that a reasonable mistake of
law is a defense when the mistake relates to an issue of law "collat
eral" to the "penal law" and negates the mental element of the
crime.21 For example, a person commits bigamy only if she knows
that the person she is marrying is already married to someone else;
although she wouldn't have a defense if she professed to be una
ware that bigamy is a crime, she might if she made a reasonable
mistake about the effectiveness of an out-of-state divorce proceed
ing - an issue collateral to the penal law - and thus didn't know
that the man she was marrying was the spouse of another.22 By the
same token, the court could have held that Marrero's reasonable
mistake about whether a federal prison counts as "any penal correc
tional facility" negated the requirement that he know he wasn't a
"peace officer" for purposes of the gun possession statute.
One could try to distinguish Marrero from the bigamy case on
the ground that the law defining "peace officer" wasn't genuinely
collateral to the criminal offense charged. But this distinction isn't
analytically compelled: Why regard the criminal procedure code's
definition of "peace officer" as any less collateral to the New York
gun possession statute than is the law defining who counts as an18. See People v. Marrero, 404 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
19. See People v. Marrero, 422 N.Y.S.2d 384 (App. Div. 1979).
20. See People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068 (N.Y. 1987).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Anton, 683F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that the
issue of what constitutes "consent of the Attorney General" to re-entry following deporta
tion is a "collateral" issue for mistake of law purposes). See generally MODEL PENAL CODE,
§ 2.02 cmt 11 (1985); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusnN W. Scarr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMI
NAL LAW§ 5.l(d), at 585-86 (1986).
22. See, e.g., Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 459, 463 (1874). This conclusion is not universal,
however. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusnN W. Scarr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 408-09
(2d ed. 1986) (noting contrary authority).
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other's spouse to the crime of bigamy? Either characterization of
the definition of the peace officer statute - collateral or intrinsic to
penal law - is conceptually supportable; to choose between them
requires a reason.
The New York Court of Appeals's reason for denying a mistake
of law defense was the Holmesian

utility of knowledge principle.

The point of punishing the legally mistaken, the court explained, is
"to encourage the societal benefit of individuals' knowledge of and
respect for the law."23 Were Marrero to be afforded a defense,
"[m]istakes about the law would be encouraged."24
There's nothing persuasive in this account. The anxiety of stra
tegic heedlessness obviously rang false in Marrero's individual case.
Marrero hadn't deliberately shielded himself from legal knowledge;
rather he had tenaciously attempted to ferret it out, displaying ex
actly the type of dedication to legal learning that the utility of
knowledge purports to value.
Nor would an excuse for Marrero have promoted strategic
heedlessness in others. Marrero sought to present a reasonable mis

take of law defense. Had the court sided with Marrero, it would
have been establishing, in effect, a negligence standard with respect
to the existence or meaning of the law defining who counts as a
"peace officer" under the New York gun possession statute. Under
such a standard, heedlessness would be a foolish strategy, for a law
breaker who deliberately failed to take reasonable steps to learn
the law would be deemed negligent and hence denied a defense.

In fact, if the goal were truly to maximize private knowledge of
law, a negligence standard would be unambiguously superior to a
strict liability standard. This is so because the value of learning the
law is always higher when the law excuses reasonable mistakes of
law than when it doesn't.
A person will take reasonable steps to learn the law when the
expected benefit of having legal information exceeds the expected
cost of obtaining it.25 This benefit can take a number of forms. If a
person invests in learning the law, she might discover that some
course of conduct that she would otherwise have engaged in - for
example, carrying an unlicensed handgun

-

is unlawful and conse-

23. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d at 1069.
24. 507 N.E.2d at 1073.
25. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Private Versus Socially Optimal Provision of Ex
Ante Legal Advice, 8 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 306, 307 {1992); Steven Shaven, Legal Advice About

Contemplated Act!': The Decision to Obtain Advice, !tr Social Desirability, and Protection of
Confidentiality, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 127 {1988).
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quently not worth undertaking given the penalty. Alternatively,
she might learn that some course of conduct that she otherwise
would have forgone is in fact perfectly legal and hence worth en
gaging in after all. But unless she believes the possibility of some
such benefit is sufficiently high, she won't bother to invest in learn
ing the law and will instead rely on her untutored judgment about
what the law happens to be.26
The probability of realizing a benefit sufficient to defray the cost
of legal research will always be higher when the law excuses reason
able mistakes of law than when it doesn't. As Marrero himself dis
covered, even after a person takes reasonable steps to learn the law,
there always remains some residual risk that a court will disagree
with that person's conclusions. In a regime that imposes strict lia
bility, that person will be punished notwithstanding her reasonable
effort to learn the law; the prospect that one's legal information will
tum out to be incorrect thus diminishes the value of obtaining such
information ex ante. Under a negligence standard, however, rea
sonable mistakes of law are a defense; accordingly, once a person
takes reasonable steps to learn the law, she is insured against pun
ishment even if it turns out that her information is mistaken. Be
cause the expected value of having legal information is thus higher
under a negligence standard than under a strict liability standard,
more individuals will conclude that investing in legal knowledge is
worthwhile if the law in fact excuses reasonable mistakes.27
26. See generally Richard S. Murphy & Erin A. O'Hara, Mistake of Federal Criminal
Law: A Study of Coalitions and Costly Information, 5 SuP. CT. EcoN. REv. 217, 227-30
(1997) (modeling incentives to acquire legal infonnation).
27. This point can be illustrated mathematically. Imagine a person is contemplating con
duct that would confer a benefit of 40. Before she engages in legal research, she believes that
the conduct is illegal and that the expected penalty for engaging in it is 100. She won't en
gage in the conduct at that point because the expected return is 40 - 100, or -60. Now imag
ine that the cost of doing "reasonable research" into the law is 5; imagine further that the
person believes there is a 50% chance that the research will give her a reasonable belief one she estimates, say, is 80% likely to be correct - that the conduct is actually legal. She
will invest in learning the law at that point only if the 50% chance that her prior belief will
change in this way is worth more than 5. It will be under a negligence rule: in that case, the
expected value of obtaining the infonnation is the benefit from acting on the basis of a
changed belief about the legality of the conduct, discounted by the likelihood that her belief
will change, minus the cost of obtaining the infonnation, or (40)(0.5) - 5, which equals 15.
The 0.2 chance that the changed belief will prove to be wrong - that is, that the conduct
engaged in will be deemed illegal, contrary to the actor's expectations - does not diminish
the value of obtaining the infonnation, because in that event the actor's mistake will be
reasonable and hence furnish a defense to criminal liability. Under a strict liability rule,
however, such a mistake would be no defense; as a result, the actor would have to subtract
from the expected value of obtaining and acting on favorable infonnation not just the cost of
getting that information, but also the expected penalty for acting on what turns out to be a
mistaken reasonable belief, or (40)(.5) - 5 - (.2)(100), which equals -5. Since the expected
value of obtaining and acting on favorable infonnation under a strict liability rule is negative,
the individual won't bother to invest in legal research.
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The relative effects of strict liability and negligence in promoting
legal knowledge expose the first crack in the classic conception of
the mistake of law doctrine. Both strict liability and negligence
punish the heedless; however, negligence rewards all, and strict lia
bility only some, of the citizens who take reasonable steps to learn
the law's commands. In other words, if the goal is only to protect
society from the legally stupid, either strict liability or negligence
will suffice; but if society genuinely aspires to make its citizens le
gally wise, it should pick negligence. The steadfast refusal of the
law to excuse reasonable mistakes, then, displays much more am
bivalence about private learning of the law than is suggested by the
Holmesian utility of knowledge principle.
This ambivalence is laid bare by a second holding in Marrero.
Marrero grounded his reasonable mistake of law defense in a New
York statute that was meant to liberalize the common law position
on when such mistakes excuse.28 That statute - section 15.20(2) of
the New York criminal code - provided:
A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he
engages in such conduct under a mistaken belief that it does not, as a
matter of law, constitute an offense, unless such mistaken belief is
founded upon an official statement of the law contained in (a) a stat
ute or other enactment ... or (d) an interpretation of the statute or
law relating to the offense, officially made or issued by a public ser
vant, agency, or body legally charged or empowered with the respon
sibility or privilege of administering, enforcing or interpreting such
statute or law.29
Read literally, section 15.20(2) seemed to excuse Marrero: his mis
take was "founded upon an official statement of the law contained
in . . a statute," namely, the criminal procedure code provision
defining who qualifies as a "peace officer."
.

The New York Court of Appeals, however, rejected this argu
ment.30 According to the court, section 15.20(2) was modeled on
section 2.04(3) of the Model Penal Code, which states:
A

belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a de
fense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when
...[a person] acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of
the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained
in ...a statute or other enactment . . .31
.

28. See Marrero, 507 N.E.2d at 1070.

29. N.Y. Penal Law § 15.20(2) (McKinney 1987).
30. See Marrero, 507 N.E.2d at 1070.
31. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.04(3) (1985).
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Marrero's mistake clearly didn't entitle him to a defense under this
standard: the "statement of the law ...contained in" the New York
procedural code, and on which Marrero relied, was not "afterward
determined to be invalid or erroneous"; only Marrero's private un
derstanding of that statement was. As construed by the court of
appeals, section 15.2 0(2), like section 2.04(3) of the Model Penal
Code, excuses reasonable reliance only on the mistakes of courts,
legislatures, and other official interpreters, and not reasonable reli
ance on a private citizen's own mistakes.
But was it proper for the court of appeals to read the language
of section 15.2 0(2) as if it were identical to section 2.04(3)? That
depends on how far one thinks the New York legislature was trying
to go in modifying the common law position. The court of appeals
concluded that the legislature meant to go as far as the drafters of
the Model Penal Code, who decided to permit reasonable mistake
as a defense only when a citizen was misled by a government offi
cial; the court of appeals concluded that the legislature, contrary to
the literal meaning of the statutory text, did not intend to take the
additional step of excusing even reasonable private misreadings of
statutes because the idea that the legislature meant to do something
that outrageous was, to the court, all but unthinkable:

[T]he idea was simultaneously to encourage the public to read and
rely on official statements of the law, not to have individuals conve
niently and personally question the validity and interpretation of the
law and act on that basis. If later the statute was invalidated, one, who
mistakenly acted in reliance on the authorizing statute would be re
lieved of criminal liability. That makes sense and is fair. To go fur
ther does not make sense and would create a legal chaos based on
individual selectivity.32
... If defendant's argument were accepted, the exception would
swallow the rule....There would be an infinite number of mistake of
law defenses which could be devised from a good-faith, perhaps rea
sonable but mistaken, interpretation of criminal statutes, many of
which are concededly complex....Our holding comports with a stat
utory scheme which was not designed to allow false and diversionary
stratagems to be provided for many more cases than the statutes con
templated. This would not serve the ends of justice but rather would
serve game playing and evasion from properly imposed criminal
responsibility.33
By now it should be clear who the mistake of law doctrine is
really afraid of. It's not, or at least not only, the strategically heed32. Marrero, 501 N.E.2d at 1071 (emphasis added).
33. 507 N.E.2d at 1073.
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less, but also the impudently inquisitive - the lay interpreter who
isn't content to rely on her untutored judgment, supplemented by
what officials tell her the law means, but who insists on inspecting
the law for herself and forming her own admittedly reasonable view
about what the law is saying. It is not that person's deliberate igno
rance of, but rather her exacting attention to, the law's fine points
that we must regard as a "false and diversionary stratagem[]," a
form of "game playing and evasion" that we should construe the
law to discourage. But this question remains: What exactly makes
this person's diligent efforts to decode the law so unwelcome?

II.

.KING: Do WHAT'S RIGHT, NoT WHAT
You THINK Is LEGAL

To see why the law might regard a little legal knowledge as dan
gerous and a lot as even more so, consider the story of Cleora Olive
King.

King was convicted of possession of a "controlled sub

stance," namely, the stimulant phentermine.34 On appeal, King ar
gued that phentermine wasn't on the state's controlled substance
list at the time she possessed it. The Minnesota Supreme Court
rejected that contention, as well as any suggestion that King had a
viable mistake of law defense about the controlled status of the
drug: "It is a deeply rooted concept of our jurisprudence that igno
rance of the law is no excuse."35
King wasn't the only one surprised to discover that phentermine
was a controlled substance at the time she was arrested; so was the
Minnesota legislature. Only the day before King was charged, the
legislature had enacted a statute putting phentermine on the list but
with an effective date of three months hence.36 What the legislature
didn't know when it passed this statute, however, was that
phentermine was already a controlled substance in Minnesota and
had been for over a year.37
The source of the legislature's mistake was the complexity of the
scheme by which drugs become controlled substances. Under the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act, there are three ways to add
substances to the state's list: by statute, by administrative regula
tion, and by what amounts to legal osmosis - the automatic inclu34. See State v. King, 257 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Minn. 1977).
35. 257 N.W.2d at 697.
36. See 257 N.W.2d at 698 (Otis, J., dissenting).
37. See 257 N.W.2d at 695.
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sion of any substance controlled by federal law.38 When a federally
controlled substance is automatically added to a state's list - as
was the case for phentermine in Minnesota - no public notice ever
needs to appear in any species of state law; rather, notice must ap
pear only if a state agency decides to exclude a federally controlled
substance from the state's list.39 Consequently, to determine
whether a particular substance is controlled under state law, one
must carefully consult not just state but also federal law.40 It's not
that hard to miss something, as the Minnesota legislature's own
mistake about phentermine suggests. No one can seriously main
tain that the Uniform Controlled Substances Act was designed to
make it easy for members of the general public to figure out the
law.
On the contrary, the Act reflects an undisguised resentment of
such knowledge, and for a very simple reason: it enables loop
holing. Substances on a jurisdiction's controlled substance list are
defined by their chemical composition. But it's often possible to
alter the composition of such a substance slightly without changing
its pharmacological effects. This creates the opportunity for a le
gally adroit chemist to evade punishment by continually reformu
lating her wares in response to legislative attempts to ban them. In
order to deal with this form of strategic behavior, federal and state
law delegates the power to designate controlled substances to ad
ministrative agencies, which can respond much more quickly than
can legislatures to the development of new designer drugs.41
The loopholing problem generalizes. Because the means by
which bad people can invade the rights of others are infinitely nu
merous and diverse, any attempt to specify them all by statute is
bound to be incomplete. If the law prohibits altering or counterfeit
ing vehicle titles, for example, offenders will attempt to achieve the
same effect by inducing state agencies to issue genuine titles con-

38. See UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES Acr § 201(d), 9 U.L.A. pt. II, at 28-29
(1988); Curry v. State, 649 S.W2d 833, 836 (Ark. 1983) (noting that a federally controlled
substance becomes a state controlled substance "by operation of law" unless a state agency
affirmatively blocks designation).
39. See UNIFORM CoNTRoLLED SUBSTANCES Acr
(1988).

§ 20l(d),

9 U.L.A. pt.

II,

at 28-29

40. See, e.g., King, 257 N.W2d at 698 ("Had defendant made an effort to ascertain
whether her possession was lawful, she, as any other member of the public, would have been
directed to the Federal Register and the delegation provisions here considered
")
•

•

.

•

.

41. See, e.g., Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 163 (1991) (discussing federal delega
tion to administrative agencies).
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taining false information;42 if it prohibits the interstate transporta
tion of forged checks, they'll wait until they cross state lines before
signing them;43 if it bans sawed-off shotguns defined as those with
barrels of less than 17.5 inches, they'll meticulously cut them down
to 18.44 Delegating power to an agency to close such gaps as
quickly as they are discovered is one device for responding to the
law's persistent incompleteness; another, even more common one is
prudent obfuscation of the law's outer periphery.45 Statutory terms
like "fraud," "thing of value," and criminal "enterprise" are vague
enough to "encompass a wide range of criminal activity, taking
many different forms and [attracting] a broad array of perpetrators
operating in many different ways."46 They remove offenders' temp
tation to look for loopholes ex ante by giving courts the flexibility
to adapt the law to innovative forms of crime ex post.
The mistake of law doctrine reinforces the prudent obfuscation
strategy.47 Strict liability makes loopholing hazardous; it says, in
effect, that the law will punish any misstep should a person attempt
to negotiate the deliberate complexities and uncertainties of the
law. A negligence standard, in contrast, would actually magnify the
loopholing problem - not by encouraging ignorance, but by in
creasing the returns from investing in legal knowledge. Were the
law to excuse reasonable mistakes of law, designer drug manufac
turers and other strategically inquisitive wrongdoers would be re
warded not only for discovering actual loopholes, but also for
discovering what they mistakenly but reasonably perceived to be
loopholes.48 Presumably there would be lots of mistakes like those,
42. Cf. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (construing the statute to avoid
such a loophole).
43. Cf. McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 655 (1982) (refusing to read the statute in
a manner that would create such a loophole).
44. Cf. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 634 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticiz
ing the majority for reading the statute to exacerbate such a loophole).
45. See generally Dan M Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SuP. Cr.
REv. 345, 409-12 (discussing the use of statutory vagueness to deter loopholing).
46. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248-49 {1989) (discussing "enter
prise" as used in RICO); see also United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) ("When a 'new' fraud develops - as constantly happens - the mail fraud
statute becomes a stopgap device to deal on a temporary basis with the new phenomenon,
until particularized legislation can be developed and passed to deal directly with the evil.");
Kahan, supra note 10, at 475-77, 481-82 (discussing the generative character of federal fraud
and property offenses).
47. Cf. Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Elhauge, Knowledge About Legal Sanctions, 92
Mica L. REv. 261, 287-88 (1993) (recognizing the utility of vagueness and restrictions on
dissemination of legal information if law is believed to be underinclusive).
48. Again, this point can be illustrated mathematically. Imagine an individual believes
that the benefit of some form of unlawful conduct is 40, and the expected penalty 100; she
won't engage in that conduct because the expected return is 40 - 100, or -60. But now imag-
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given the deliberate complexity of criminal laws such as the Uni
form Controlled Substances Act. Indeed, because a negligence
standard would give a defense. to anyone who could say that she
reasonably understood her conduct to be legal, it would almost
completely vitiate the benefits of statutory vagueness, which seeks
to combat loopholing precisely by making the outer reaches of the
law reasonably uncertain.
The use of prudent obfuscation to discourage loopholing might
be thought to raise a puzzle from a deterrence point of view. If the
law aspires to be deliberately vague and complex, and if it tries to
discourage rather than reward inquiry into the fine points of law by
punishing even reasonable mistakes, how can it expect individuals
who want to be law-abiding to know what their legal duties are?
The answer is supplied by legal moralism. Most individuals
know how to live law-abiding lives without ever consulting their
,
community s criminal code. This is so because they assume that the
criminal law tracks certain basic moral norms, with which the law
abiders and law-breakers alike are thoroughly familiar. It seems
unlikely, for example, that King, who made her living as a prosti
tute, not as a designer-drug manufacturer, ever looked up
,
phentermine on Minnesota s controlled substances list; yet her as
sumption that the drug was illicit is confirmed by her concealment
of it in a small foil packet discovered in her underwear upon her
arrest for soliciting.49 Even the loopholer is aware that her conduct
conflicts with the moral norms that determine criminal law, or else
it would never occur to her that there was a need to search out a
means of evading punishment for her behavior. The law's resent
ment of legal knowledge is consistent with deterrence, then, beine that she believes that the cost of loopholing - that is, searching for an analogous fonn of
apparently unregulated conduct- is 5; imagine further that the individual believes that there
is a 50% chance that such searching will disclose conduct that she is 80% sure (that is, rea
sonably sure) is legal. Whether loopholing will be worthwhile to that person at that point
turns on the standard for assessing mistakes of law. Under a negligence standard, loopholing
pays: the expected value of loopholing is the benefit from engaging in the analogous but
apparently unregulated fonn of conduct, discounted by the likelihood that the person will
discover such conduct, minus the cost of searching for it, or (40)(.5) - 5, which equals 15.
There's a .2 chance, of course, that what appears to be a loophole won't be one in fact- that
is, that the analogous conduct will also tum out to be illegal, contrary to the individual's
expectations. But because that mistake of law will be deemed reasonable and hence a de
fense, this pseudo-loophole will be worth just as much as a genuine one. Loopholing won't
be worthwhile, however, under a strict liability rule. For in that case, the individual must
subtract from the expected value of loopholing not just the cost of such activity, but also the
expected penalty for acting on what turns out to be a mistaken reasonable belief, or 15 (.2)(100), which equals -5. Because the expected value of loopholing is negative, strict liabil
ity should deter the individual from seeking to evade the law in that manner.
49.

See State v. King, 257 N.W.2d 693, 698 n.4 (Minn. 1977).
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cause the law expects that in the absence of such knowledge
individuals will be more reliably guided by their knowledge of what
is moral.
This expectation, moreover, inflicts another blow to the classic
conception of the mistake of law doctrine. The Holmesian under
standing asserts that the doctrine seeks to encourage knowledge of
the law (utility of knowledge) in order to compensate for the law's
own indifference to the moral goodness of citizens' motivations (lib
eral positivism). The truth, though, is that the doctrine attempts to
discourage legal knowledge (prudent obfuscation) so that individu
als will be more inclined to behave morally (legal moralism). Strict
liability warns citizens not to be Holmes's bad man. It tells them
that if they suspect that some species of immoral conduct may
evade the reach of the law, the only sure way to avoid punishment
is to do what they know is right, not what they think is legal.50
This account makes it easier to see why Marrero came out the
way it did. Marrero ignored the law's injunction to do what's right
rather than what one thinks is legal. New York's restrictive gun
possession law embodies its citizens' strong antipathy toward, and
fear of, handguns. But rather than defer to those norms, Marrero
decided to be strategic, availing himself of what must have ap
peared even to him to be a largely fortuitous gap in the law. That's
the attitude that made the court see in Marrero's efforts to decode
the law not an earnest and laudable attempt to obey but rather a
'!false and diversionary stratagem[]," a form of "game playing and
evasion."51 Other facts, not even mentioned by the court, also
likely played a role: that the policy of the federal prison at which
Marrero worked forbade guards to carry guns either on or off duty;
that Marrero had supplied his girlfriend and another companion
with guns, even though they clearly had no grounds for believing
their possession to be lawful; and that Marrero menacingly reached
for his weapon when the police approached him in the Manhattan
club.52 These facts might not have been formally relevant to the
court's disposition, but they no doubt helped the court to see Mar50. Cf. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952) ("[M]ost stat
utes must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual situations, and the practical
necessities of discharging the business of government inevitably limit the specificity with
which legislators can spell out prohibitions. Consequently, no more than a reasonable degree
of certainty can be demanded. Nor is it unfair to require that one who deliberately goes
perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the
line.").
51. People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 1073 (N.Y. 1987).
52. See De Gregorio, supra note 14, at 231-32, 233 n.24.
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rero as a Holmesian bad man. And in the eyes of the court, a
Holmesian bad man is plenty bad enough to be designated a
criminal.
Another way to see the doctrine's repudiation of liberal positiv
ism is to consider the relative effects of strict liability and negli
gence on marginally legal behavior. By marginally legal behavior, I
mean conduct that is just barely legal because of its exceedingly
close proximity to the line between what's lawful and what's not.
This is exactly the kind of conduct that Holmes's bad man wants to
engage in. A negligence standard makes engaging in such conduct
relatively safe: even when the line between what's lawful and
what's not is indistinct, individuals may approach it without appre
hension so long as they have taken reasonable steps to ascertain
where that line is drawn, for in that case inadvertent trespasses into
the territory of illegality will be forgiven.
Strict liability, in contrast, is much less accommodating. It pun
ishes persons who inadvertently cross the line notwithstanding their
reasonable efforts to stay on the lawful side of it. To avoid this
residual risk of penalty, some persons will choose to steer well clear
of the line between lawful and unlawful behavior and thus forgo
even marginally legal behavior.s3 From the point of view of liberal
positivism, this chilling effect on marginally legal behavior is unfor
tunate, because the law expects no more from individuals than that
they behave lawfully. But from the point of view of legal moralism,
the chillin g effect of strict liability is good: because of the persistent
incompleteness of the law relative to morality, marginally lawful be
havior - whether the distribution of an uncontrolled designer drug
or the possession of an unregulated but dangerous firearm - is still
likely to be immoral and thus worth deterring.
This preference for moral over purely legal motivation also
sharpens the focus of the normative issue surrounding the mistake
of law doctrine. The debate is ordinarily framed as one between
retributivists, who object to the doctrine's supposed indifference to
blameworthiness,s4 and utilitarians, who (like Holmes) defend pun
ishing the blameless for the sake of securing important collective
ends.ss The grounding of the doctrine in legal moralism, however,
53. See generally Murphy & O'Hara, supra note 26, at 233-36.
Husak & von Hirsch, supra note 11, at 158-59, 174; Edwin R. Keedy, Igno
rance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARv. L. REv. 75, 84-85 (1908).
55. See HoIMES, supra note 2, at 41; WILUAMs, supra note 7, at 289; cf. 1 JoHN AuSTIN,
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 482 (reprint 1911) (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed., London,
John Murray 1885) (asserting that the rule is justified by the interest in avoiding fraud).
54. See, e.g.,
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suggests that the debate is really about something else: not whether
it's justified to punish the morally blameless, but rather when some
one should be regarded as morally blameworthy. Critics of the doc
trine view only those who knowingly choose to violate the law as
deserving of punishment, whereas proponents are unwilling to ex
cuse from blame a person who behaves immorally merely because
she happens to believe (mistakenly) that her conduct is legal.
The proponents' stance is more compelling. Consider, first, a
person who knows that some species of harmful conduct - whether
assaulting a pregnant woman for the purpose of killing her fetus,56
or writing a series of bad checks as part of a "check kiting"
scheme57 - is immoral, but (mistakenly) believes it to be legal. On
any viable theory of morality, the choice to harm another in this
way justifies condemnation, whether or not the conduct is unlawful.
Because the person would deserve moral condemnation even if it
turned out that such conduct was legal, it's obvious that her mistake

about the legality of the conduct doesn't excuse her as a moral mat
ter. Indeed, if the person comes to the (mistaken) conclusion that
such conduct is lawful on the basis of legal research, we are likely to
condemn her more, not less, severely: for in that case her action
reflects not only the culpable choice to harm another, but also the
culpable choice to search out means of evading accountability for
such action. If there is a reason to afford such a person a legal
excuse, that reason can't be that she is morally blameless.
, , , Now consider the only slightly more complicated case of a per
son who engages in wrongful conduct mistakenly believing it to be
both legal and moral. In her case, we couldn't say that she know
ingly chose to do wrong. But we might well say that she was culpa
bly inattentive to her moral obligations. The moral norms that
typically inform the criminal law express judgments about the high
worth of important goods and values.58 We expect individuals - at
least if they are mentally competent adults - to recognize and as
sent to these appraisals, and if they don't, we judge them negatively
on that account.59 Imagine a person who assaulted another out of
56. Cf. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970) (holding that such conduct is
not within the terms of the state homicide statute).
57. Cf. Wtlliams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982) (holding that a statute prohibiting
"false statement" to a bank should be read not to reach check kiting).
58. See generally JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN lIAMPToN, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 25,
43-44 (1988); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591,
597-98 (1996).
59. See LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINs: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD AND KINDRED
PUZZLES OF THE LAW 128-30 (1996).
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racial animus, or who engaged in sexual relations with a ten-year
old, and who professed to be unaware that such conduct was im
moral (much less illegal). Rather than being a ground for sympa
thy, that person's moral ignorance would itself provide grounds for
condemning her, for it would reveal that she doesn't care about
things - the equal dignity of all persons, the psychological and
physical well-being of children - that she ought to care about, and
that she does care about other things - racial hatred, sexual domi
nation of vulnerable and dependent persons - that she shouldn't.
This sensibility is grounded in an understanding of morality
that's willing to blame people not just for knowingly choosing to do
wrong, but also for having bad character. When we condemn some
one for being inattentive to moral obligations, we are saying that
she lacks the values that would have motivated a good person to
perceive the real value of things.60 This understanding of blame is
commonplace in our ordinary moral practices: "But it was an acci
dent!"; "So? If you had cared about me, you wouldn't have said
that/done that/forgotten that." It's also commonplace in criminal
law: the punishment of negligent homicides condemns persons for
caring so little about others that they fail to perceive the unreasona
ble danger they are exposing them to;61 the punishment of persons
who kill because of unjustifiable anger or hate - even when those
dispositions are unwilled and interfere with the capacity to conform
to the law - condemns them for having the bad values that inspire
bad emotions.62 The mistake of law doctrine likewise condemns in
,
dividuals for a character defect - namely, an insufficient commit:'.
ment to the moral values that stand behind the criminal law.63
60. Cf. R.B. Brandt, A Motivational Theory ofExcuses in the Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL
JusnCE: NoMos XXVII 165, 176-77 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985)
(suggesting a theory of blame that rests on dispositional commitment to appropriate values).
61. See R.A. Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability, 12 LAw & Pmr.. 345, 349-50
(1993).
62. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 313-14, 353.
63. Whether or not these values are universal, people do not always universally subscribe
to them. Indeed, an individual whom we might be inclined to condemn for being inattentive
to community norms might well owe her ignorance to her immersion in competing, subcom
munity norms. Sometimes the law accommodates moral diversity of this kind. See, e.g.,
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610-15 (1994) (reading a mistake of fact defense into
the National Firearms Act to avoid criminalizing possession of weapons that are not con
demned by common experience). More often, however, it does not, as reflected in the re
fusal of the law to recognize the so-called "cultural defense" - the claim that the defendant's
ignorance of the law should be excused because the conduct in question is moral in her native
land. See generally Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L REV 1293
(1986). Obviously, individuals don't always "choose" their formative communities; the will
ingness of the law to condemn them for having the values that such unchosen attachments
engender testifies to the depth of the law's commitment to appraising individuals for their
characters. Whether a commitment this deep is warranted is another question.
.
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CHEEK.' A DEFENSE FOR

THE

VIRT UOUS

Not every mistake of law, however, displays bad character.
When a person makes the kind of error that even a morally virtuous
person could make, then her ignorance of the law should be an ex
cuse. That is the moral of Cheek v. United States. 64
Cheek neglected to file tax returns for several years. His de
fense to charges of criminal tax evasion was that he honestly be
lieved he owed no tax on the salary he earned as a pilot for
American Airlines. Cheek claimed to have formed this belief on
the basis of lectures by members of a tax protest group, who per
suaded him that wages were not taxable income for purposes of the
federal tax code and that any form of income tax violated the Con
stitution. After being instructed that these beliefs were not a de
fense, the jury convicted.65
But the Supreme Court reversed. Reaffirming precedents of
over a half century's standing, the Court held that a person can be
convicted of criminal tax evasion only if he "intentional[ly] vio
lat[es] . . . a known legal duty."66 Under this standard, Cheek's mis
taken beliefs about the unconstitutionality of income taxes would
not be a defense, the Court reasoned, because a person who de
clines to comply with the law on that basis is nevertheless aware
that he has a duty to pay under the tax code.67 However, a person
who honestly believes - however unreasonably - that wages or
any other species of income aren't taxable under the code would
have a defense, for in that circumstance he couldn't be said to
"know" that he had a duty to pay.68 The Court remanded the case
for retrial under this standard.
The Supreme Court, like other courts, tends to give meaning to
an ambiguous criminal statute not by mechanically parsing its text
but by imputing to the legislature an intent to enact the reading that
the Court itself views as best.69 This was so in Cheek. A person is
guilty of criminal tax evasion only if her failure to pay is "will
ful[ ],"70 a term that can be understood to refer merely to knowl64. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
65. See 498 U.S. at 194-96.
66. 498 U.S. at 196 (emphasis added).
67. See 498 U.S. at 205-06.
68. See 498 U.S. at 202-03.
69. See Kahan, supra note 45, at 370-89. In other words, the Court does exactly what
Hart and Sacks said it should do with respect to statutes generally. See HENRY M. HART, JR.
& ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPU
CATION OF LAW 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
70. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203 (1994).
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edge of the factual elements of a crime.71 The Court in Cheek
construed "willful" to mean knowledge of legal duty because of the
"the complexity of the tax laws."72 "The proliferation of statutes
and regulations has sometimes made it difficult for the average citi
zen to know and comprehend the extent of the duties and obliga
tions imposed by the tax laws. "73 It was thus implausible to think
that Congress " 'intend[ed] that a person, by reason of a bona fide
misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to
make a return, or as to the adequacy of the records he maintained,
should become a criminal.' "74
Had the Court accepted the premises of the classic conception
of the mistake of law doctrine, it certainly wouldn't have used its
interpretive discretion to engraft a mistake of law defense onto the
tax code. Denying an excuse for any type of mistake might not be
the best way to promote knowledge of the law, but allowing one for
all such mistakes is the surest way to discourage it. If a person can
be convicted only for intentionally violating known tax obligations,
then she is better off ignorant. The complexity of the tax code,
moreover, only multiplies the opportunities for this form of strate
gic heedlessness. Thus, far from being a ground for softening the
traditional mistake of law doctrine as the Court in Cheek suggested,
complexity - as the court in Marrero, for instance, recognized75 is a ground for hardening the law's resolve not to excuse ignorance.
Or at least it is if one accepts the premises of the classic concep
tion of the doctrine. Matters are more complicated under the anti
Holmesian conception.
On the anti-Holmesian view, it's just to punish a person
notwithstanding her ignorance of law - even complex laws, like
the Uniform Controlled Substances Act - insofar as her conduct
reveals that she is insufficiently committed to the moral values that
the law reflects. Obviously, such an account presupposes that the
71. See, e.g., United States v. Gunn, 97 F. Supp. 476, 480 (W.D. Ark. 1950) (so construing
"willfully"); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8)-(9) (1985) (defining "willfully" as "knowingly"
and indicating that the mental element of the statute is presumed to apply only to facts and
not to law). See generally Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994) (" 'Willful,' this
Court has recognized, is a •word of many meanings,' and 'its construction [is] often
influ
enced by its context."' (alteration in original) (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492,
497 (1943))).
72. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200.
73. 498 U.S. at 199-200.
74. 498 U.S. at 200 (quoting United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933)).
75. See People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 1073 (N.Y. 1987) (noting that precisely be
cause criminal law is "complex," dispensing with strict liability could create "an infinite
number of mistake of law defenses [based on] good-faith, perhaps reasonable but mistaken,
interpretation[s]").
.

.

•
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criminal law embodies moral norms that have an existence in
dependent of the law itself. Criminal tax provisions don't. Individ
uals don't have a moral duty, independent of law, to tum over a
portion of their income to the government. Consequently, we can't
disregard what a person understood her legal duties to be when we
are morally appraising her failure to pay a tax. If she

knew she

owed the tax, then we are almost certain to condemn her - not for
engaging in an intrinsically immoral act, but for attempting to ex
empt herself from obligations to which other members of the com
munity have submitted in the interest of the common good.76 But if
she didn't know, then we must press deeper to see whether such
ignorance was itself morally culpable.
It is at this point that the complexity of the tax code becomes
relevant. The obligation to pay a tax on one's salary or wages is a
simple matter; ignorance of it displays such a gross degree of inat
tention to civic duty that one can justly be blamed for that very lack
of knowledge.77 But the tax code extends far beyond the obligation
to pay tax on one's wages or salaries: it encompasses as well one's
duty to pay tax on barter transactions,78 to recognize taxable gains
associated with swapping comparable mortgage portfolios,79 and to
make withholdings from the wages of once-weekly maids.so

Good

persons - from the "average citizen"81 to the prospective Supreme
Court Justice82 - can make mistakes about these duties, which in
volve no independent moral obligation and which aren't a matter of
common civic knowledge. A mistake of law defense protects these
excusably inattentive actors from punishment. Of course, it might
protect some culpably inattentive ones from punishment, too, inso
far as courts are obliged, as a matter of statutory construction, to
treat all mistakes of law alike. Excusing the vicious Cheek for his
76. See HERBERT MoRRis, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 33-34 (1976) (developing a theory
of desert along these lines).
77. Cf. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 209-10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is incomprehensible to
me how, in this day, more than 70 years after the institution of our present federal income tax
system with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1913, any taxpayer of competent mentality
can assert as his defense to charges of statutory willfulness the proposition that the wage he
receives for his labor is not income, irrespective of a cult that says otherwise and advises the
gullible to resist income tax collections." (citation omitted)).

See 26 C.F.R. § 1.61-2(d) {1996).
See Cottage Sav. Assn. v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 559-67 (1991).
80. See generally Rita L. Zeidner, W&M Panel Hears Pleas for Simplification of Domestic
Employee Tax Laws, 58 TAX NoTES 1282, 1284 (1993) (reporting the IRS position that
78.

79.

housekeepers are employees and not independent contractors).
81.

See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199.

82. See Richard L Berke, Favorite for High Court Failed to Pay Maid's Taxes,
TIMES, June 13, 1993, at 1.

N.Y.
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ignorance was thus necessary to avoid condemning many virtuous
ones for theirs. 83
Another way to see this point is to reflect on the difference in
how we typically regard marginally legal behavior in the tax field
and how we regard it in other domains of criminal law. When the
law implements independent moral norms, members of society are
likely to view marginally legal behavior with disapproval. Because
of the persistent incompleteness of law relative to morality, persons
who deliberately try to skirt the line of what separates, say, legal
from illegal drug distribution, or mere sharp dealing from fraud,
strike us (usually) as morally bad persons. Punishing them if they
miscalculate gives them exactly what they deserve and helps to rein
force for the rest of us what being good entails. But society feels
differently about persons who try to find "loopholes" in the tax
code; we don't condemn those persons, but instead compensate
them with hundreds of dollars an hour, and honor them with status
and respect. Giving them an excuse for ignorance of law imple
ments the widely shared (but by no means uncontentious) judgment
that persons like that shouldn't be deemed criminals when they
make honest mistakes.
The anti-Holmesian conception of the doctrine can also explain
why the Court in Cheek declined to make mistakes of constitutional
law a defense. These beliefs, the Court explained, "do not arise
from innocent mistakes caused by the complexity of the [code]";
"[r]ather, they reveal full .knowledge of the provisions at issue and a
studied conclusion, however wrong, that those provisions are inva
lid and unenforceable."84 In other words, it is not morally "inno
cent" but morally culpable to insist on one's own understanding of
one's civic obligations when one knows that one's position has been
considered and rejected by legislatures, administrative agencies,
courts, and other institutions authorized to define what those obli
gations are. The willingness to abide by the judgments of those in83. This tradeoff, however, might not be as stark as it seems. Although ignorance of the
obligation to pay a tax on wages stands on the same fonnal footing as ignorance of the tax
status of a complex business transaction, the reality is that juries are much less likely to
believe the genuineness of the claimed ignorance in the fonner case than in the latter. A
court that crafts a mistake of law defense to protect excusably inattentive actors can thus
bank on the jury's situation sense as a hedge against the appropriation of that defense by
culpably inattentive ones. Cf. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 203-04 ("Of course, the more unreasonable
the asserted beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider them to
be nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal duties imposed by the tax laws
and will find that the Government has carried its burden of proving knowledge."). Cheek
was in fact convicted on remand. See United States v. Cheek, 3 F.3d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir.
1993).

84. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 205-06.
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stitutions, while not an uncontested understanding of moral and
civic virtue, is nevertheless clearly recognizable as such.
Of course, the tax code isn,t the only complex body of criminally
enforceable law that doesn,t implement independent moral norms;
the same can be said for banking law, broadcasting law, and elec
tion law, among others. If the point of strict liability is to punish
individuals who are culpably inattentive to society,s moral norms,
then we should expect to see courts fashioning exceptions to the
mistake of law doctrine for all manner of malum prohibitum
offenses.
Which is exactly what we do see. Structuring banking transac
tions so as to avoid having to report them is not "obviously 'evir ,,
or "inevitably nefarious.',85 There's "nothing inherently wrong in
making', a campaign contribution without disclosing it to the gov
ernment.86 There,s nothing about broadcasting on a CB radio with
out an FCC license thafs "likely to create danger" or otherwise
make a "reasonable man . . . aware that he [is doing something]
forbidden. ,'87 Exporting and importing "amphibious vehicles,
pressure-breathing suits, [and] aerial cameras" can be done "inno
cently', and thus can,t be analogized to distribution of illicit "sub
stances which are known generally to be controlled by government
regulation, such as heroin or like drugs.',88 In all of these settings,
and in various others,89 courts have recognized mistake of law as a
defense because the underlying conduct violates no moral norms
independent of the law that prohibits it.
85.

See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 144-48 (1994).

86. State v. Azneer, 526 N.W.2d 298, 300 (Iowa 1995); see also United States v. Curran,
20 F.3d 560, 569 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that unreported campaign contributions are not
"obviously 'evil' or inherently 'bad" ').

87. United States v. Simpson, 561 F.2d 53, 62 (7th Cir. 1977).

88.

United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 828

(9th Cir. 1976).

89. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426-27 (1985) (recognizing a mistake
of law d_i:fense for the misuse of food stamps on the ground that regulations relating to their
use cover "a broad range of apparently innocent conduct," from destroying them to using
them to buy food from a store charging above-normal prices to food stamp program partici
pants); United States v. Jonas Bros., 368 F. Supp. 783, 784-85 (D. Alaska 1974) (holding that
the mistake of law defense is available to the federal offense of transporting wildlife in viola
tion of state Jaw if the state law in question is a malum prohibitum state hunting restriction);
Long v. State, 65 A.2d 489, 498 (Del. 1949) (recognizing a reasonable mistake of law defense
where the conduct is "neither immoral nor anti-social in our culture"); Commonwealth v.
Rudnick, 60 N.E.2d 353, 355 (Mass. 1945) ("The indictment being for conspiracy to commit
an offense which is malum prohibitum only (alteration of building without a permit from
building commissioner], there must have been an intent to do wrong
and
knowledge
of the existence of the law and knowledge of its actual or intended violation."); cf. United
States v. Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. 29, 35 (D.D.C. 1974) (recognizing the "rule that mistake of
Jaw often is a defense to malum prohibitum crimes" but concluding that "unauthorized entry
and search
are malum in se").
•

•

.

.
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•

•

.
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Still, courts don't invariably recognize mistake of law defenses
for crimes of this kind. As a statement of black letter law, the rule
that ignorance of law excuses malum prohibitum - but not malum
in se - crimes is overbroad; indeed, it takes no real detective work
to find cases that say just the opposite - that ignorance of law is no
excuse "whether the crime charged is malum prohibitum or malum
in se"90 - although that proposition too is (as I've just shown)
wildly overstated. So why do courts permit mistake of law as a de
fense only selectively across malum prohibitum crimes?
The answer, the anti-Holmesian view suggests, is in part a mat
ter of timing. Well into the first decades of the twentieth century,
the law's resistance to excusing legal ignorance was nearly absolute.
But it wasn't until about that time that the criminal law was pressed
into the service of regulating essentially malum prohibitum con
duct. So long as there was an essential unity between criminal law
and community moral norms, the uncompromising application of
strict liability was the best means for implementing prudent obfus
cation and legal moralism. The absolutism of this approach came
into tension with the (anti-Holmesian) premises of the doctrine,
however, with the advent of malum prohibitum crimes, and it
wasn't long after that that courts began to recognize exceptions to
the principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse.91 There was a
transition period, though, during which some courts resisted any
softening of the doctrine; and their resistance, memorialized in the
case reports, continues to furnish a convenient rhetorical foothold
when a contemporary court is inclined to deny a mistake of law
defense for a crime that looks malum prohibitum.
A court is most likely to feel this inclination in two circum
stances. The first, again, is when ignorance of the law - even a
malum prohibitum one - connotes bad character. Ignorance
doesn't connote bad character when the statutory scheme in ques
tion regulates the common place activities of ordinary citizens
whose contact with intricate laws - such as the tax code - is un
derstandably irregular and fleeting. But matters are different when,
say, the defendant is a sophisticated participant in a "closely regu
lated" industry;92 we expect "repeat players" to be attentive to the
90. E.g., Blumenthal v. United States, 88 F.2d 522, 530 (8th Cir. 1937); State v. McDer
mott, 220 A.2d 38, 43 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1965).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933).
92. See United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1285 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United
States v. Gunn, 97 F. Supp. 476, 480 (W.D. Ark. 1950) (justifying the denial of a mistake of
law defense for a company ignorant of the licensing requirement for interstate shippers on
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rules of the game.93 Matters are different, too, when someone is
engaged in behavior that, while not strictly speaking immoral, nev
ertheless exposes the public to unusually high risks: it might not
occur to someone who is transporting "[p]encils, dental floss, [or]
paper clips" that his conduct is subject to stringent safety regula
tions, but if it doesn't to someone who is transporting "dangerous
or deleterious devices . . . or obnoxious waste materials,"94 then
he's missing a critical faculty of moral perception. In these particu
lar settings, ignorance of a malum prohibitum obligation, no less
than ignorance of a malum in se one, expresses a culpable failure to
attune oneself to basic civic norms.
The second circumstance in which judges might be tempted to
deny that malum prohibitum crimes get special treatment is when
they want to avoid the burden of explaining why they really view
the conduct in question as malum in se. It goes without saying that
the line between prohibitum and in se will often be blurry. It should
go without saying as well that drawing the line will often be a con
troversial and even politically perilous task for a court to under
take. It's inconvenient to declare the transporting of alcohol during
and immediately after Prohibition to be intrinsically immoral;95 it's
risky to be seen as jumping into the fray when management ejects a
union official from company property.96 Life is much easier for a
court in these and like cases when it can simply invoke a rule "ignorance of the law is never an excuse, for malum prohibitum of
fenses or malum in se ones" - that spares it the burden of justify
ing the denial of a defense. But against the background of all the
malum prohibitum crimes that now do get mistake of law defenses,
the invoking of such a rule serves only to conceal, and does not
the ground that the company engaged in sustained dealings with an interstate shipper and
thus "is presumed to have a practical knowledge of the law commensurate with its duties").
93. Cf. Murphy & O'Hara, supra note 26, at 257. Indeed, courts sometimes draw distinc
tions between sophisticated, rep.eat players and unsophisticated, intermittently regulated par
ties, affording a mistake of law defense to the latter but not the former. Compare United
States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795, 796-97 (9th Cir. 1993) (allowing a mistake of law defense for
an independent transporter who was unaware of permit requirements for customer's waste)
with United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1284 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) (denying the defense
for managers of a toxic waste facility because they "are clearly in the best position to know
their own permit status").
94. United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564-65 (1971)
(transportation of hazardous chemicals); accord United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275,
1284-85 (9th Cir. 1993) (discharge of toxic wastes).
95. Cf. Blumenthal v. United States, 88 F.2d 522, 530-31 (8th Cir. 1937) (denying the
defense for transporting liquor across state lines without proper labeling).
96. Cf. State v. McDermott, 220 A.2d 38, 43 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1965) (denying the defense to
a union official convicted of trespass who believed, allegedly mistakenly, that he had a statu
tory right to be on plant property).
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genuinely eliminate, the need for the court to make contentious,
context-specific judgments about which actors have characters good
enough to be excused for their mistakes of law.
That such discretion must be exercised, moreover, completes
the indictment of the classic conception of the mistake of law doc
trine. Had the doctrine embodied the normative side of liberal pos
itivism - that is, had it been accepted by courts that the law ought
to judge persons only by the conformity of their actions to the stan
dard laid down by law and not by the conformity of their characters
to an extralegal conception of moral virtue - courts would never
have perceived the need to reform the doctrine upon the advent of
malum prohibitum crimes. Moreover, had courts been intent on
conserving the positivistic character of the law as a descriptive mat
ter, they would never have reformed it by making an exception for
malum prohibitum crimes, much less only for certain of them. For
one can determine whether a particular species of conduct whether possessing a gun, distributing a drug, or neglecting to pay a
tax - is malum in se or malum prohibitum only by appraising that
conduct in light of moral norms external to positive law. Once it is
acknowledged that an important component of the law depends on
this kind of appraisal, a person who "want[s] to know the law,"
even if she wants to know "nothing else,"97 has no choice but to
view the world through a good person's eyes.
CONCLUSION
This essay had two aims. One was to identify the true basis of
the mistake of law doctrine; the other was to distill from that ac
count some general conclusions about the relationship between
criminal law and morality. I'll now take stock.
The classic conception of the mistake of law doctrine, I've ar
gued, is false. Th.at understanding asserts the utility - indeed, the
indispensability - of widespread legal knowledge in a political re
gime that disclaims any reliance on its citizens' commitment to a
moral orthodoxy. If maximizing legal knowledge were really the
objective, however, the law would apply a negligence standard,
rather than a strict liability standard, to legal mistakes. Refusing to
excuse even reasonable mistakes discourages investments in legal
knowledge by making it hazardous for a citizen to rely on her pri
vate understanding of the law. Th.is resentment of legal knowledge
makes sense because the doctrine assumes, contrary to the classic
97. Holmes, supra note 1, at 459.
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conception, that individuals are and should be aware of society's
morality and that morality furnishes a better guide for action than
does law itself. Thus, far from trying to maximize the incentive that
presumptively bad men have to know the law, the doctrine seeks to
obscure the law so that citizens are more likely to behave like good
ones.
What does this conception of the doctrine reveal about the crim
inal law more generally? One lesson is that the criminal law is in
tensely moralistic. The mistake of law doctrine is an integral part of
a strategy of prudent obfuscation aimed at remedying the persistent
imperfection of criminal law relative to morality. The standard of
culpability reflected in the doctrine, moreover, judges individuals
not just for the conformity of their conduct to law, but also for the
conformity of their values to society's moral norms. Indeed, be
cause it generally excuses individuals for mistakes of law that even
a virtuous person would make, the doctrine demands that courts
interpret society's morality in the course of interpreting its criminal
statutes so that they can determine which mistakes of law reflect
bad character.
But another lesson that emerges from the anti-Holmesian ac
count is that the law is ambivalent - indeed, almost embarrassed
- about exactly this kind of moralizing. The positivistic idiom of
the classic account drives the rhetoric of the decisions, even when
the decisions defy that account's central premises in substance.
Legal moralism, secured by prudent obfuscation, is the truth of the
mistake of law doctrine. But it is a truth that one can get at only by
prying back the doctrine's antimoralistic, Holmesian veneer.
Stealthy moralizing is in fact endemic to criminal law. The prin
ciple of legality, for example, proclaims that legislatures alone are
responsible for defining crimes and disavows any lawmaking role
for courts;9s the truth, however, is that criminal statutes typically
emerge from the legislature only half-formed and must be com
pleted through contentious, norm-laden modes of interpretation
that are functionally indistinguishable from common-law making.99
Public debate about the death penalty is dominated by empirical
claims relating to deterrence, when in fact parties on both sides
ground their positions in nonempirical but contested moral be
liefs.mo The rhetoric of duress, provocation, and insanity depicts

98. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CiuMINAL SANCI10N 79-102 (1968).
99. See Kahan, supra note 45, at 367-89.
100. See generally Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes:
Americans' Views on the Death Penalty, J. Soc. lssUES, Summer 1994, at 19; Tom R. 'fyler &
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emotions in pseudo-scientific, mechanistic terms that obscure the
judgmental appraisals that decisionmakers make about the values
that emotions embody.101 The false prominence of liberal positiv
ism and the utility of legal knowledge in the mistake of law doctrine
is of a piece with the law's general reticence about displaying its
moral core.
I have defended the moralizing that animates the mistake of law
doctrine, but not the duplicity that surrounds it. As the stories of
Julio Marrero, Cleora Olive King, and John Cheek shoµld make
clear, the kinds of moral judgments that the mistake of law doctrine
reflects are highly contentious. Is possession of a handgun malum
in se or malum prohibitum?102 Are the persons who seek out "tax
loopholes" truly virtuous? Are the ones who make mistakes about
the status of controlled substances invariably vicious?103 If not, why
do courts see the world this way? The moralizing that occurs with
other criminal law doctrines is subject to just as much contestation.
Such judgments are on balance a good thing, and are probably inev
itable in any event, but they ought at least to be made openly.
When contentious moral judgments are camouflaged in seemingly
nonjudgmental rhetoric, decisionmakers are freed from the con
straints of public accountability, and citizens are denied the oppor
tunity to examine, criticize, and reform the judgments that their law
reflects.
It might not be realistic to expect the criminal law always to get
it right when it moralizes, particularly in light of the dissensus that
characterizes moral issues in cont�mporary society. But precisely
because citizens disagree about what's good, insisting that the law
be honest when it moralizes is definitely not too much to ask.

Renee Weber, Support for the Death Penalty: Instrumental Response to Crime, or Symbolic
Attitude?, 17 L. & SoCY. REv. 21 {1982).
101. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 372-74.
102. Compare the New York Court of Appeals's decision in Marrero with Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 613 (1994), in which the U.S. Supreme Court read a mens rea
requirement into a silent statute in order to respect "the common experience that owning a
gun is usually licit and blameless conduct"
103. Cf. Idaho v. Fox, 866 P.2d 181 {Idaho 1993) (holding that a mistake of law is no
defense for the possession of the asthma medication ephedrine, which was a controlled sub
stance in Idaho but an over-the-counter drug in other states).

